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Wildlife conservation by farmers: analysis of actual and contingent participation 
Abstract 
This paper exammes actual and contingent participation of farmers in wildlife 
conservation programmes. Probit and tobit modelling were used to analyse the effect 
of farm characteristics and farmer attitudes on participation. The optimal bid offer was 
derived from a referendum CV survey for a proposed field margin programme. Actual 
participation was highest for organic farmers and farmers facing area specific 
restrictions. Contingent participation was strongly affected by bid offer. Furthermore, 
specialisation, integrated farming, off farm income sources, risk perception and ditch 
length positively influenced contingent participation. The CVM-experiment showed 
that up to 60 percent participation might be achieved with appropriate bid offers. 
Implications of the results for policy are discussed. 
Keywords: wildlife conservation, CVM, intensity of participation, probit, tobit. 
Introduction 
Recently, wildlife conservation on agricultural land receives much attention from 
policy makers in the European Union. Land use policies are being developed that 
pursue both environmental and wildlife objectives. These policies provide incentives 
to landowners and farmers to maintain the current situation or to convert land to more 
environmentally benign uses. 
In a conservation program determined through (textbook) market interaction, 
farmers compete for a given conservation budget with self-defined practices through a 
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tender approach. The competition ensures efficient allocation of the budget. Real 
world conservation schemes rarely take this approach. Instead these programs are 
basically a combination of incentive based policies and command and control in the 
sense that fixed amounts are offered for a limited number of approved conservation 
practices. A judgement of what can be expected from using such policies requires a 
representation of both the command and control and the incentive component and a 
detailed representation of the activities these real world policies intent to target 
(Schwabe and Smith, 1998). Specifically, a lack of participation in these programs 
may be due to either the incompatibility of the approved conservation practices with 
farm and farmer characteristics or to an inappropriate amount of incentive payments. 
This paper examines both aspects. 
Exactly which factors influence farmers' participation m voluntary agri-
environmental schemes in not yet fully understood. Brotherton (1989) provided an 
influential theoretical analysis that highlighted that both 'scheme factors' and 'farmer 
and farm factors' need to be taken into consideration. For example, Wilson's (1997) 
factor analysis for the ESA UK includes e.g. farmer's age, education, succession, the 
information environment as well as farm size and tenure and characteristics of the 
scheme such as payments levels and scheme duration. Other studies in more recent 
years emphasise the importance of farmer's attitudes towards the environment (Morris 
and Potter, 1995) and how structural and attitudinal factors interplay in the individual 
farmers' decision making process (e.g., Falconer, 2000). Economic models based on 
profit maximisation fail to encompass attitudinal variables altogether whereas 
omission of important explanatory variables that are correlated with variables 
included in econometric models leads to biased estimators and to invalidation of 
inference procedures (Greene, 1997). In order to handle this problem a comprehensive 
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approach to explain programme participation is required that integrates normative 
economic and behavioural aspects, together with institutional and biophysical aspects. 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is the predominant method for 
analysing opportunities for (new) incentive schemes. Typically consumers' 
Willingness To Pay (WTP) is measured for the non-market goods associated with 
agriculture, viz. species conservation, water quality and pastoral landscapes. In 
contrast, few studies have addressed the concomitant supply side of these 
environmental goods. Bonnieux and Rainelli (1995) estimated a value for agricultural 
landscape using the WTA-concept. Farmers were asked the minimmn amount they 
were willing to accept to implement a specific change in their farming practices. 
Cooper ( 1997) also used CVM to estimate the minimum incentive payment farmers 
would require in order to adopt more environmentally friendly "best management 
practices" (BMPs). To predict adoption the CVM data were combined with actual 
market data on enrolment in BMPs, furthermore Cooper considered intensity of 
adoption by estimating the acres enrolled as a function of the incentive payment. Only 
a limited number of farm and farmer characteristics were used in the regressions and 
none of the studies mentioned, incorporated farmer attitudes and perceptions. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we intend to assess the factors 
that explain farmers' participation in existing conservation programs. Secondly, we 
analyse farmers' contingent participation in a new wildlife conservation program and 
the acreage enrolled as a function of the incentive payment. A range of farm and 
farmer characteristics including attitudes and perceptions were considered. Measuring 
respondent attitudes, as recommended by the US NOAA (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration) may help interpret valuation questions (Arrow et al., 
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1993; Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). Eliciting attitudes toward the environment is 
expected to enhance CVM, in particular. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the theoretical 
background followed by an application for field crop fanners in the Netherlands. The 
new incentive scheme consisted of a voluntary nation-wide field margin prograrmne 
with carefully selected vegetation and management opportunities, reducing the risk of 
weed and pest problems. The paper finishes with conclusions and special attention for 
policy implications. 
2. Theoretical background 
Actual participation 
The decision to participate in an existing wildlife conservation program takes the fonn 
of a binary variable which suggest that either a logit or probit model is appropriate. 
Both type of models relate the dependent and independent variables non-linear, 
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however based on two different cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the 
random variable. Whereas the logit model is based on the logistic CDF the probit 
model is based on the normal CDF. In this study the following probit model is 
proposed to explain actual participation in conservation programs: 
k Y; = {30 + }:J3jxif +u; (1) 
j;I 
with: 
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Yi = 1, if />O (farmer i adopted wildlife conservation measures), and 
y; = 0, otherwise 
Xif =vector of explanatory variables: farm and farmer characteristics 
U; = random error 
Contingent participation 
To analyse contingent participation in. a proposed wildlife conservation program both 
the WTA (receiving compensation for a loss) and WTP format (paying something for 
a foregone gain) may be used. Respondents however, will be far less familiar with the 
notion of paying for a foregone gain causing far greater uncertainty and variability in 
answers to WTP questions than occurs with WTA questions (see also Turner et al, 
1994). Therefore WTP was avoided in favour ofWTA. 
While it is possible to directly elicit farmers' minimum WT A to adopt a 
conservation practice, the referendum approach, as recommended by the US NOAA 
Panel, is likely to be preferable (Arrow et al. 1993). The dichotomous choice (DC) 
form of CVM was used to take the referendum approach. Under DC-CVM, the 
respondent is prompted to provide a yes or no response to a bid amount contained in 
the valuation question, where the bid amount is varied across the respondents. 
Compared with eliciting the WT A in an open-ended fashion, this method is 
particularly likely to reveal accurate statements of value as the format reduces the 
ability of the respondent to purposely bias the study results (Hoehn and Randall, 
1987; Cooper, 1997). 
When using the referendum approach, CV responses are binary variables, 
therefore one need a statistical model appropriate for a discrete dependent variable. 
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Logit and probit models play a key role in the analysis of discrete CV data. A probit 
model is proposed to explain farmers' contingent participation. To this end the bid 
amount is incorporated in the model as an explanatory variable. 
with: 
Zi=\, if z*>0 (farmer i accepts the offer), and 
z, = 0, otherwise 
xtj - vector of explanatory variables: farm and farmer characteristics, bid amount 
Ui = random error 
Intensity of participation 
When participation in a wildlife conservation program is considered a binary decision, 
all participants are treated the same neglecting quantity differences among 
participants: intensity of the participation decision. In case of wildlife programs the 
maximum intensity is reached when the total available acreage is used for 
conservation. Intensity of participation is therefore defined as the proportion of the 
total available acreage that is used for conservation. Since this variable has a censored 
distribution (values between 0 and 100) a tobit model is proposed to explain intensity 
of participation: 
k 
7=1 
with: 
at = ßo + X ßjxü + U' *°r participating farmers (3) 
0 for farmers who are not participating 
w,~IN(0,a2; 
and 
a,= extent of participation farmer i in incentive program 
Xjj = set of explanatory variables: farm and farmer characteristics, bid amount 
3. Application 
3.1 Review of wildlife conservation in the Netherlands 
Until recently, in the Netherlands as well as in other EU member states, wildlife 
conservation mainly focused on farming areas located within or alongside the so-
called Ecological Main Structure (EMS): An ecological network of nature reserves 
and interconnecting zones. Farmers in and near these areas receive subsidies for a 
variety of conservation management practices, ranging from extensive cereal growing 
to the development and maintenance of landscape elements. 
The majority of farmers in the EU are located outside the EMS. EU-Regulations 
1760/87 and 2078/92 mark the acceptance, that instead of the traditional distinct 
geographical segregation of agricultural and wildlife functions as in the EMS, both 
functions should to a large extent blend within the rural environment. Besides, also in 
ecological circles attention is shifting towards the preservation of wildlife within the 
major forms of primary land use in addition to nature reserves and other protected areas 
(Edwards and Abivardi, 1998). In the Netherlands, policy towards these so-called white 
areas has taken two forms. Incentives for pastoral farming have been introduced 
which focus on meadow bird protection and alternative ditch bank management. For 
crop farming areas, conservation activities concentrate on fallow land and in field 
margins. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature Management developed 
an incentive for enhancing wildlife on land that has been set-aside as part of the EU-
support regulations for cereal crops. Payments are offered to cover the extra cost 
associated with the wildlife management including seed and seeding costs of special 
mixtures of dicotyledons. In 2000, only 190 crop farmers participated with a total of 
500 hectares consuming approximately 25% of the total budget available. In addition, 
provincial authorities developed incentives for field margins. Management 
opportunities vary across provinces and payments vary accordingly. Participating in 
these national and regional schemes has been disappointing. Only a limited number of 
farmers participate in the cost share programs offered for the white areas. The most 
recent data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics show that 3,3% of specialised 
crop farmers are involved in activities concerning wildlife conservation (LEI/CBS, 
2000). These include both farmers involved in EMS related activities and activities 
regarding the white areas. This number is much lower than for land based animal 
husbandry (cattle, sheep, etc.) where 8,2% of the farms is involved in wildlife 
conservation. 
It is hypothesised that participation in wildlife conservation programs is affected 
by: 
• The production environment on the farm. When less favourable conditions exist 
on the farm, gross margins of crop production will be smaller and other activities 
such as wildlife management are relatively more attractive. 
• Farm size. Small farms usually grow a larger proportion of (labour) intensive 
high-returning crops and will therefore be less attracted to wildlife activities. 
Morris and Potter (1995) found that, when looking at participation in agri-
environmental schemes in the United Kingdom, it was the younger farmers with 
the largest more economically buoyant farms who tended to find schemes 
attractive. 
• Successor situation. It is assumed that farmers without successor are less 
production oriented and more willing to adopt conservation oriented farming 
(Potter and Lobley, 1992). 
• Familiarity with conservation programs. Not all farmers are aware of the 
regulations and incentives available for wildlife conservation, hampering 
participation. 
• Societal commitment of farmer. Farmers that are more sensitive to what society 
wants are expected to be more open to wildlife conservation activities. 
• Innovativeness of the farmer. Innovative farmers that like to try new production 
methods are expected to be less hesitant towards wildlife conservation. 
• Risk attitude towards wildlife conservation practices. From other studies (Van der 
Meulen et al., 1996; Buys et al., 1996) it is known that the perceived risk of weed 
infestation and spread of pests and diseases is a major factor for not participating 
in wildlife conservation programs 
It is hypothesised that wildlife schemes that have lower weed and disease risk features 
than existing programs may increase participation rates. Furthermore we expect a 
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higher participation rate and a higher intensity of participation, in terms of the area 
used for the practice, when payment levels increase. 
3.2 Survey 
A survey was compiled and pre-tested with 8 crop farmers. After minor adaptations 
the survey was mailed to 1000 farmers from three important crop farming regions in 
the Netherlands: the provinces of Groningen, Drenthe and Flevoland. 278 
questionnaires were returned. After removing questionnaires from test farms, non-
crop farms as well as incomplete questionnaires, 250 remained for analysis. 
The survey consisted of five parts: (1) general information about the farmer and 
the farm, (2) detailed information on the production environment of the farm 
(parcellation, ditches, woodrows), (3) farmer attitudes: towards society, towards 
agricultural wildlife conservation (risk perception and valuation of positive 
externalities), and innovativeness by scoring statements on 5-point Likert scales, (4) 
familiarity with existing wildlife conservation programs, (5) actual adoption of 
wildlife measures in terms of alternative field margin and fallow management (6) 
contingent participation: a fictitious field margin practice was introduced to the farmer 
(Table 1) and his or her Willingness to Accept was analysed using the referendum 
approach. As discussed in section 2, the dichotomous choice (DC) form of CVM was 
used to take this approach. Bid amounts in this study varied between NLG 1000 and 
5000 per hectare. Average gross margins (excluding costs for contract work) for a 
cropping plan with cereals, potatoes and sugar beet range from NLG 3000 for sandy 
soils to NLG 5000 for the top clay soils (PAV, 2000). However, near the field edge, 
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yields and associated gross margins are significantly lower than for the field centre 
(De Snoo, 1996). 
<TABLE 1> 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the data set as well as variable definitions. 
Variables INNOV, SOCIE, NVALUE and RISK reflecting farmers attitudes were 
measured on a 5 point Likert scale and converted to dummy variables (agree/disagree) 
because Likert scales are non-metric variables. Likert values 1 and 2 were converted 
to 0 (disagree) and Likert values 3, 4 and 5 were converted to 1 (agree). No 
multicollinearity was found among variables used. From the data it was concluded 
that farmers from the Province of Flevoland had the highest response rate. 
Furthermore there was a positive response bias towards larger farms and "wildlife 
oriented "farms. 20 Percent of the respondents participated in a wildlife program for at 
least one year during the period 1997-1999, whereas in 1999 for the whole of the 
Netherlands 3,3 % of specialised crop farms and 5,9% of mixed crop farms employed 
wildlife activities (LEI/CBS, 2000). 
<TABLE 2> 
3.3 Empirical Model 
Given the theoretical model and the hypotheses formulated, the empirical application 
focuses on both actual and contingent participation in wildlife programs. Data were 
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obtained from different geographic regions. Soil type, crop rotation but also 
parcellation characteristics are different for these regions enabling a wide range of 
conditions to be studied. 
Actual participation (PART) was considered a binary choice: farmers participating in 
at least one wildlife program in one of the last three years were regarded participants. 
The wildlife programs considered were, provincial field margin programs, the nation-
wide program for fallow land, and programs linked to the Ecological Main Structure. 
Explanatory variables include farm and farmer characteristics: 
PART* = ß0 + $xAGEi + $2SUCQ + ß3F7YP, + faOINQ + ßsLABFt + foTOTHAt + 
faPMETIi + foPMETOi + foSHRENi + $wCEREAt + ßnPROVFt + $nPROVGt + 
fiiiRESTRi + VuSTYPi + fasFISIZf + $i6DITCHi + $xlWOODRi + faYEARSi + 
$i9FAMli + ß2oFAM2i + faINNOVt + faSOCIEt + foNVALUi + ^2ARISKi + u, 
With PART = ƒ 1 if PART*>0 
^ 0 otherwise 
For variable definitions see Table 2. 
Contingent participation (CPART) was considered a binary choice. Table 1 presents 
the proposed field margin program that was offered to farmers. The proposed program 
was derived from the existing program for set aside land (MINLNV, 2000). This 
scheme was set up to encourage wildlife enhancing practices on set MacSharry- side 
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land by providing compensation payments for additional seed and costs for specific 
nature fallow mixtures. The program however is only available for full field 
application and only seed costs are remunerated. Compared to existing field margin 
programs, usually predominantly consisting of unsprayed cereals, weed and disease 
risks of the proposed program are lower, increasing compatibility with ordinary 
farming practices. In addition to the actual participation regression, bid offer and 
actual participation (0/1) were used to explain contingent participation: 
CPARTi* = ß0 + PiAGEi + fcSUCQ + ßiFTYP/ + faOINQ + fcLABFi + %TOTHAt + 
faPMETIi + VzPMETOi + foSHRENi + faCEREAi + $uPROVFi + $nPROVGi + 
friRESTRi + VwSTYPi + ßisF/S/Z, + ß16D/rC//, + $l7WOODRi + faYEARSi + 
$l9FAMli + ß2oFAM2i + ß2i/AWOF, + ß22SOC/£, + foNVALUj + ß^SAT, + 
fcsPART^ ß26ß/A + ut 
With CPARTi = r 1 if CPART*>0 
I 0 otherwise 
Intensity of participation (INTPA) was measured as the proportion of the total margin 
length that farmers intended to use for the proposed conservation practice (see Table 
1). Since this explanatory variable has a censored distribution (values between 0 and 
100) a tobit model was estimated with: 
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INTPAi = ß0 + ßiAGEi + fcSUCd + ß3F7YP, + faOINQ + ß ^ 5 F , + %TOTHAt + 
frPMETI, + ßsPMETOt + foSHRENt + ß,0C£tf£4, + ßnPÄ0KF, + ß,2PÄOW, + 
fiijRESTRi + ßi4S7YP, + ßis^S/Z, + frsDITCHi + foWOODRt + ßi8r£4/?S, + 
ß19F^M7, + fcoFAM2i + faINNOV, + faSOCIEt + faNVALUt + fcJUSKi + 
ß25P^Ä7;+ ß26£/A + "/ 
for those participating and 
i 
INTPA i =0 
for those not partcipating in the proposed field margin program. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Actual participation 
The effects of the explanatory variables on the probability that a farmer participates in 
an existing wildlife management program are presented in Table 3. PMETO and 
RESTR are significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively, indicating that organic 
farmers as well as farmers that face area specific restrictions are more likely to 
participate. Furthermore PROVG was significant at the 5% level indicating that 
participation of farmers from the Province of Groningen was lower compared to the 
referencen area (Province of Drenthe). FAM2 (Familiarity with field margin 
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regulations) was nearly significant at the 5% level (P=0.07), with the magnitude of the 
coefficient indicating an effect on participation. 
<TABLE 3> 
4.2. Contingent participation 
The effects of the explanatory variables on the probability that a farmer would accept 
the bid offered in the contingent valuation experiment is presented in table 4. A highly 
significant effect (P<0.001) of bid offer (BID) on contingent participation was found. 
Figure 1 present the relationship between bid offer and percentage of acceptors of the 
offer. It is clear that from NLG 3000 per hectare onwards participation rates remain 
fairly constant at levels around 60%. 
Factors FTYPE and OINC are significant at the 1% level indicating that specialised 
crop farmers and farmers with non-farm income sources are more willing to accept 
the offer. Also ditch length per ha had a significant affect on contingent participation 
(PO.05). Contrary to actual participation, contingent participation was not affected by 
production method and province. 
<TABLE 4> 
<FIGURE 1> 
4.3 Intensity of participation 
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A tobit regression was carried out to determine the effect of the explanatory variables 
on the intensity of participation. Intensity was defined as the proportion of the total 
acreage of field margins on the farm that was offered for the new incentive program. 
Table 5 shows the effect of the explanatory variables on intensity of participation. All 
factors that were significantly affecting contingent participation, also significantly 
affect intensity of participation. In addition to the CPART-model, PMETI and RISK 
are significant the 5% level, indicating that integrated farmers and farmers that have a 
lower perception of weed risks are willing to devote a higher proportion of their field 
margins to the proposed program. 
<TABLE 5> 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
A survey among crop farmers was conducted to analyse actual participation in 
wildlife conservation programs and contingent participation in a proposed field 
margin program. Probit and tobit modelling were used to analyse the effect of farm 
characteristics and farmer attitudes on participation. 
Participation in existing wildlife programs was highest for organic farmers, as well as 
for farmers that face area specific restrictions. Contingent participation was highest 
for specialised crop farmers and for integrated farmers. Furthermore it was concluded 
from the CVM-experiment that participation rates around 60 % may be achieved with 
a bid offer above NLG 3000 per hectare for the proposed field margin program. 
The expected positive influence of farm size and successor absence on 
participation in wildlife conservation programs was not confirmed by the survey and 
neither was familiarity with existing conservation programs. The hypothesised 
relation between societal commitment and innovativeness of the farmer on the one 
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hand and willingness to participate in wildlife programs on the other hand was not 
observed for any of the models. Risk perception of wildlife measures did not 
significantly affect the decision to participate in both the actual programs and the 
proposed program. It did however significantly affect the intensity of participation in 
the proposed program. The hypothesis that the production environment would 
influence participation was confirmed by the survey. Area specific restrictions 
significantly and positively affected actual participation. 
Overall the conclusions regarding the importance of the location of the farm (area 
specific institutional constraints) corresponds very well with the findings of Wilson 
(1997) for the ESA UK and of Kristensen et al. (2001) for landscape activities in 
Denmark. These studies found that the location factor (local socio-economic and 
biophysical environment) is a more important factor for understanding farmer 
involvement than a large range of farm and farmer characteristics. This study 
observed between an interesting difference in participation in existing wildlife 
programs and contingent participation, which might be due to scheme factors and 
farm and farmer factors. Scheme factors include the bid amount, and lower weed risks 
of the proposed field margin program as opposed to existing conservation programs. 
Whereas organic farmers, familiar with weed and disease risks, were attracted by the 
existing programs, the proposed program predominantly attracted integrated farmers, 
stressing the importance of scheme factors. Farmer factors in the first place include 
the bias towards wildlife-orientation in the sample. Familiarity with existing programs 
on the other hand was not found to significantly influence actual or contingent 
participation. 
The study results regarding contingent participation suggest that participation rates 
in wildlife programs could be enhanced through conservation schemes that reduce the 
risks of weed and disease when compared to existing programs and that have adequate 
financial compensation features. Co-operation between policy and the farming 
community to discuss agronomically appropriate incentive schemes that are also 
adapted to the local circumstances therefore may well result in an increased 
participation in conservation schemes. 
Finally it should be noticed that in spite of the high amounts of money that were 
offered for the proposed program in this study, 40 % of the farmers were still reluctant 
to participate. From the comments written by farmers on the returned survey forms it 
was clear that the perceived government interference with farming, was a major factor 
for not participating. Further research into the motives of these farmers is advised. 
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Table 1 Field margin package offered in contingent valuation experiment 
1. Field margins of 3 m 
2. No chemical spraying and fertilizing of margins between 1 January and 1 October. 
Incidental knapsack spraying to control problem weeds is allowed 
3. Margins have to be sown with a mixture of at least 3 different dycotyledons such as 
clovers, phacelia etc. (seed costs: approx. NLG 150/ hectare) 
4. The regulation is not valid for margins of whole fields that have already been set aside 
5. The margins do not count for the MacSharry set aside scheme. 
6. Sowing before 15 May and no tillage until 1 October 
7. A maximum of one cutting is allowed 
8. Minimum length of 500 meters 
9. Participation is voluntary and stopping is allowed after every year 
10. Variable premium amounts (NLG/ha) 
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Table 2. Description and summary statistics of dependent and independent variables 
Variable 
PART 
CPART 
INTPA 
AGE 
SUCC 
FTYP 
OINC 
LABF 
TOTHA 
PMETI 
PMETO 
SHREN 
CEREA 
PROW 
PROVG 
RESTR 
STYP 
FISIZ 
DITCH 
WOODR 
YEARS 
F AMI 
FAM2 
INNOV 
SOCIE 
NVALU 
RISK 
BID 
Description 
Experience with wildlife oriented field margin and 
fallow land practices in past 3 years (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
Willingness to Accept offered field margin package (1 
if yes, 0 if no) 
Percentage of field margins on the farm used for 
offered fictitious field margin package 
Age of eldest farm manager 
Successor (1 if present or not yet known, 0 if no) 
Farm type (0 if crop, 1 if mixed crop) 
Number of non-farm income sources 
Labor force (FTE) 
Farm size (Ha) 
Integrated Production method (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
Organic production method (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
Percentage of short term rented land (max 1 yr.) 
Percentage of cereals in crop rotation 
Province Flevoland (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
Province Groningen(l if yes, 0 if no) 
Number of area specific restrictions applicable to the 
farm (e.g. drinking water area, Ecological Main 
Structure) 
Soil type (0=sandy, l=clay) 
Average field size (Ha) 
Ditch length per ha (m) 
Woodrows per ha (m) 
No. of years actual participation 
Familiarity with nature fallow regulations (1 if yes, 0 if 
no) 
Familiarity with field margin regulations (1 if yes, 0 if 
no) 
I like to try new ideas on my farm (0=disagree, 
l=agree) 
I want to know how society thinks about my farm 
(0=disagree, l=agree) 
Cropping set aside land with a nature fallow mix is 
good for the image of agriculture (0=disagree, l=agree) 
Cropping field margins with a nature fallow mix will 
cause more weed problems on my farm(0=disagree ,1= 
agree) 
Bid amount in CV question (cents/m2) 
Mean 
0.2 
0.5 
24.9 
49.7 
0.8 
0.3 
0.4 
1.7 
66.7 
0.1 
<0.1 
6.5 
25.7 
1.8 
0.2 
0.6 
7.0 
95.5 
11.7 
0.5 
0.5 
0.7 
0.6 
0.4 
0.6 
0.2 
30.4 
St. 
dev. 
0.4 
0.5 
34.9 
10.2 
0.4 
0.5 
0.53 
1.1 
54.0 
0.4 
0.2 
13.0 
17.8 
0.8 
0.4 
0.5 
4.9 
60.1 
35.7 
1,0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
13.7 
Min. 
0 
0 
0 
26 
0 
0 
0 
0.1 
8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
Max. 
1 
1 
100 
77 
1 
1 
2 
13.7 
460 
1 
1 
69 
100 
3 
2 
1 
45 
595 
357 
3 
50 
25 
Table 3. Probit estimates for parameters explaining actual participation in 
conservation programs 
Variable 
Constant 
AGE 
SUCC 
FTYP 
OINC 
LABF 
TOTHA 
PMETI 
PMETO 
SHREN 
CEREA 
PROW 
PROVG 
RESTR 
STYP 
FISIZ 
DITCH 
WOODR 
FAM1 
FAM2 
INNOV 
SOCIE 
NVALU 
RISK 
Coefficient 
-1.4897* 
-0.0028 
-0,3192 
0.1604 
0.1149 
0.0012 
0.0035 
-0.0661 
1.7278** 
-0.0026 
-0.0004 
-0.1178 
-0.6040* 
0.4898* 
-0.0073 
-0.0014 
0.0014 
0.0039 
0.2341 
0.4936 
-0.1175 
0.1660 
0.1190 
-0.1584 
P-value 
0.018 
0.117 
0.230 
0.498 
0.578 
0.865 
0.104 
0.825 
0.003 
0.410 
0.387 
0.663 
0.043 
0.029 
0.717 
0.143 
0.490 
0.326 
0.333 
0.071 
0.465 
0.454 
0.459 
0.511 
* significant at the 5% level 
**significant at the 1% level 
***significant at the l%o level 
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Table 4. Probit estimates for parameters explaining contingent participation in 
proposed field margin program 
Variable 
Constant 
PART 
AGE 
SUCC 
FTYP 
OINC 
LABF 
TOTHA 
PMETI 
PMETO 
SHREN 
CEREA 
PROW 
PROVG 
RESTR 
STYP 
FISIZ 
DITCH 
WOODR 
YEARS 
FAM1 
FAM2 
INNOV 
SOCIE 
NVALU 
RISK 
BID 
Coefficient 
-2.2655*** 
0.8595 
-0.0007 
-0.1148 
-0.7521** 
0.5607** 
-0.1851 
0.0044 
0.4410 
0.7903 
0.0029 
0.0001 
0.2292 
0.3955 
0.3751 
0.5119 
-0.0026 
0.0042* 
0.0010 
-0.3006 
-0.0211 
0.4134 
0.0011 
0.0003 
-0.0001 
0.0037 
0.0355*** 
P-value 
<0.001 
0.228 
0.700 
0.632 
0.006 
0.002 
0.164 
0.071 
0.107 
0.155 
0.304 
0.888 
0.397 
0.270 
0.129 
0.172 
0.511 
0.025 
0.744 
0.301 
0.923 
0.065 
0.666 
0.898 
0.819 
0.250 
O.001 
* significant at the 5% level 
••significant at the 1% level 
•••significant at the l%o level 
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Table 5. Tobit estimates for parameters explaining intensity of participation in 
proposed field margin program 
Variable 
Constant 
PART 
AGE 
SUCC 
FTYP 
OINC 
LABF 
TOTHA 
PMETI 
PMETO 
SHREN 
CEREA 
PROW 
PROVG 
RESTR 
STYP 
FISIZ 
DITCH 
WOODR 
YEARS 
FAM1 
FAM2 
INNOV 
SOCIE 
NVALU 
RISK 
BID 
Coefficient 
-128.9992*** 
44.4881 
-0.0046 
-18.9175 
-32.0288* 
28.1477** 
-4.1679 
0.0753 
33.9998* 
28.0392 
0.1942 
0.0094 
27.7271 
0.3529 
24.7128 
1.6590 
-0.0001 
0.2574* 
-0.1874 
-10.5054 
9.4507 
1.9498 
-0.1428 
0.1368 
0.0123 
-21.0476* 
0.3476*** 
P-value 
<0.001 
0.243 
0.972 
0.189 
0.012 
0.009 
0.485 
0.548 
0.035 
0.352 
0.377 
0.764 
0.081 
0.985 
0.053 
0.917 
0.999 
0.026 
0.257 
0.499 
0.464 
0.886 
0.835 
0.901 
0.704 
0.038 
<0.001 
* significant at the 5% level 
••significant at the 1% level 
***significant at the l%o level 
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Figure 1. Participation rate in proposed field margin program for different payment 
levels 
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